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Abstract  
In this paper I research economic, non-economic and the institutional determinants of bilateral 
migration flows into OECD countries. My contribution to the growing literature is two-fold. First, I 
explicitly account for the panel structure of migration costs (information acquisition, physical costs of 
the move and social exclusion). Second, building upon Beine et al. (2011b), I proceed with the 
analysis of determinants of bilateral migration flows disaggregated by educational attainments in the 
panel data environment. The preliminary results show that the defined cost variables are significant in 
explaining the volume and composition of the flow of migrants, the result not being sensitive to the 
model specification. Network effects promote negative self-selection and the quality of migrants 
positively correlates, while the physical distance, existence of a common language and colonial links 
between countries are insignificant in explaining the educational composition of migrants. I further 
conclude that the restrictive and skill selective immigration policies of the major destination countries 
bias the conventional role of the economic push and pull factors. 
 1. Introduction 
According to the United Nations (2009a) the estimated worldwide stock of migrants in 2010 stood at 
214 million, an increase of 19 million compared to 2005. The stock is unevenly distributed across 
continents: the largest being in Europe (70 million), followed by Asia (61 million) and North America 
(50 million). The dispersion of migrants is primarily driven by the economic opportunities, migration 
costs and immigration policies of receiving countries. 
In order to enjoy better economic opportunities in developed destination countries, there are large 
migration costs to be paid upfront. The costs are associated with overcoming the distance, integration 
into the new society and overcoming numerous migration barriers created by immigration policies. 
According to Williamson (2006) after the discovery of the Americas only the wealthiest and the 
fearless made the move. “Then, improved educational levels and living standards in poor parts of the 
world and falling transport costs globally, thanks to new technologies – have made it increasingly 
possible for other potential emigrants to finance the move.” 
To show the linkage between the migration costs and the educational composition of the immigrant 
population I plot the fraction of skilled migrants in the stock data against the logarithm of bilateral 
distance for the United Kingdom and for Australia.1
Figure 1. Correlation of migrants’ education and distance. Horizontal axis –
 
)(distanceln , 
vertical axis – fraction of skilled in the stock of migrants. 
 
 
 
 (a) [1975]  (b) [2000] 
 
Comparing the pictures for 1975 and 2000 in Figure 1 two important observations have to be made: 
first, in 2000 compared to 1975 the mean of the educational attainments of migrants is higher. Second, 
the correlation between the fraction of tertiary educated in the stock and the bilateral distance was 
positive for the UK and negative for Australia. In 2000 the relationship weakened for the UK and 
became more negative for Australia. I conjecture that there is this trend because for the last two 
decades the migration costs have significantly decreased, making traveling easier and available to a 
wider population. 
This paper explores the role of migration costs and institutional factors on the size, educational and 
country of origin composition of the migrant population. It is based on Beine et al. (2011b) and Mayda 
                                                     
1 The figure is for illustrative purposes only as it does not account for other control variables. 
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(2010) and contributes to the literature in two significant ways. First, I research the flow determinants 
by education groups in a panel environment for 1975-2000 with a five-year interval. Second, I attempt 
to quantify the migration costs and investigate their correlation with the flow of migrants accounting 
for the binding immigration policies of destination countries. 
2. Literature review 
Economic, demographic, geographic, cultural, historical and policy factors all play an important role 
in determining the direction of migration flows, their magnitude and composition. Original research on 
determinants of international migration is focused on one country only: Hatton (1995) and Hatton 
(2005) research factors behind the emigration and immigration trends for the UK, and Clark et al. 
(2007) investigate the fundamentals of immigration into the United States. Clark et al. (2007) 
emphasize the role of the immigration policy and the selection of migrants based on the country of 
origin and age of entry, whereas Hatton (2005) only considers economic and policy-related variables. 
The emergence of comparable cross-country migration flow and stock data made it possible to 
conduct the longitudinal analysis. Pedersen et al. (2008) and Mayda (2010) use OECD (2010a) data to 
research the economic and non-economic determinants of bilateral migration flows in a panel data 
environment. For 14 OECD countries during 1980 and 1995 Mayda (2010) finds a significant role 
played by geographical (distance), cultural (common language and colonial links) and demographic 
factors. In several specifications the author finds a positive but insignificant effect of the push factors, 
which can be explained by the immigration quotas in the receiving countries. The network effects are 
measured by including lagged flow values into the regression. 
The econometric model of Pedersen et al. (2008) is much different from Mayda (2010) and includes a 
richer set of regressors. However the selective character of immigration policies in major receiving 
countries is badly accounted for. They found that the income in the sending country has an inverted U-
shape effect: the richest and the poorest countries are the least likely to send migrants. The authors do not 
find empirical support for the “welfare magnet hypothesis”, according to which migrants are potentially 
attracted by the level of social expenditure in the receiving country. Similar to the existing literature, the 
network effects are found to be positive and significant in explaining immigration flows. Countries with 
more selective immigration policies tend to have stronger network effects. 
To the best of my knowledge there are few studies that investigate the linkage between migration 
costs and composition of the migrant population across countries. Beine et al. (2011b) research the 
relationship between the educational composition of migrants and the size of diaspora 2
                                                     
2 By “diaspora” the authors refer to the cross-country dispersion of people who originally come from the same country (region) with no 
implicit emphasis on any nation. I will also keep to this definition here. 
. The authors 
find that diasporas have a positive effect on the volumes of migrants irrespective of the skill level. 
However, the effect on the educational composition of migrants is the opposite: countries with large 
diasporas tend to have smaller fractions of the educated among the incoming migrants from 1990 until 
2000. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that larger diasporas decrease migration costs for 
newcomers (via information dissemination and financial channels) irrespective of skill level. The 
authors do not find strong evidence for the effect of colonial links. They note that historical links 
between countries are embodied in the current diaspora and new immigrants arrive because of the 
current economic benefits and the diaspora, not because of the former colonial links. The linguistic 
proximity increases the degree of mobility of skills and helps the low skilled find employment. 
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3. Formalization of migration costs 
Overall individual migration costs can be broken down into three categories: 
1. Costs of obtaining information. These are the costs of getting information about which 
destination country it is better to go to in terms of employment opportunities, welfare benefits 
and the legal treatment of foreign nationas. According to Beine et al. (2011b) potential 
migrants and newcomers can lower their costs by relying on the informational and financial 
support provided by members of diaspora. Further, disporas affect the volume and composition 
of migrants via family reunification. Pedersen et al. (2008) and Mayda (2010) find strong 
empirical support for the existence of network effects. 
I conjecture that the arrival of the internet in developing countries has strongly facilitated the 
dissemination of information amongst potential migrants. Figure 3 in Appendix D shows that 
even in countries with most skill-based immigration policies (Canada and Australia, for 
example) about 20% come through family reunification programs and at least that many are 
family members of accompanying workers.  
2. Physical costs. These include the costs that are associated with the actual move (transportation 
and obtaining a visa, if needed). This is affected by the development of cross-border 
transportation network (the availability of cheaper airfares, better bus and train networks).  
3. Costs of social exclusion. These include the costs of integration once in a foreign country. 
Disutility also comes from being away from the family, friends, lower pay compared to the 
locals, limited social communication due to the language barrier, discrimination and no access 
to voting.  
4. Immigration policy. It is quite challenging to quantify the immigration policy on a 
comparative cross-country basis. Mayda (2010) and Ortega and Peri (2009) have separately 
conducted studies in which they quantified the tightness of immigration legislation over time. I 
use the result of Ortega and Peri (2009) for the OECD countries under investigation. The 
immigration policy is characterized with two variables: tightness in entry laws and tightness in 
asylum laws (see Appendix B). Tougher entrance or asylum laws mean higher values in the 
respective variables. 
4. The Model 
For the sake of simplicity I assume only two countries: developed country A  (North) and developing 
Country B  (South). Each country has two types of workers: low-skilled L  and highly-skilled H . 
Respective wages for the two types are ALw  and 
A
Hw  in Country A  and 
B
Lw  and 
B
Hw  in Country B . 
The following relationship between wages holds: 
 
 BL
A
L
B
H
A
H wwww >>>  (1) 
 
The assumption in (1) ensures that (i) migration incentives exist and a non-trivial fraction of 
population of Country B emigrates; and (ii) wages are incentive compatible - the highly-skilled 
workers from Country B cannot work as low-skilled workers in Country A. 
The countries also differ in the skill composition of the local population. Let Aα  ( Bα ) denote the 
fraction of H -type workers in country A  (country B ). If the population in both countries is 
normalized to 1 then Aα  and Bα  denote amounts of skilled workforce. 
The individual decision to migrate is governed by the following rule: 
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 HLsCwww is
B
s
B
s
A
s ,=,> ∀⋅−  (2) 
 
where isC  are broadly defined individual migration costs for agent i  of type s . It is important to 
understand the rationale behind inequality (2). It says that a worker migrates if the gain from migration 
(difference of the wages) exceeds the individual migration costs, which for the normalization purpose 
are expressed in terms of the wage of the sending country. 
The individual migration costs are defined as follows:  
 
 isis cRSHDC ++++=  (3) 
 
where D  is the geographical distance from A to B, H  is the stock of migrants from Country B 
in Country A. S  is the sending country fixed effect, which accounts for the fact that residents from 
certain sending countries are more welcomed in the destination countries than residents of other 
countries due to the inter-government agreements, political regimes or the economic situation. R is 
the receiving country fixed effect, which captures the degree of openness and the skill-selectivity of 
the immigration policy. isc  is a stochastic random component distributed normally with mean 0  and 
variance 2σ , )(0,~ 2σNcis . 
Combining (2) and (3) I can write down the probability that a random migrant emigrates, i.e. his 
costs are below the threshold. Given the assumption that the population of the sending country is 
normalized to 1, Equation (4) also gives the number of migrants from B to A: 
 
 





−−−−−Φ− RSHD
w
w
w
wCProb B
s
A
s
B
s
A
s
is 1=1)<(  (4) 
 
where )(⋅Φ  is the cdf of the normal distribution. Equation (4) is directly estimable. However, the 
wage data comparable across countries and over time are scarce (see Rosenzweig, 2010 for an 
overview of data sources). For this purpose I need to express equation (4) in terms of more readily 
available indicators. 
 
 B
L
B
H
A
L
A
H
w
wY
w
wX =,=  
 AL
AA
H
AA wwW ⋅−+⋅ )(1= αα  (5) 
 BL
BB
H
BB wwW ⋅−+⋅ )(1= αα  
 B
A
W
WZ =  
 
where: 
X  and Y  is the skill premium in A  and B  respectively; AW  and BW  are average wages in A  
and B ; Z  is the wage gap between A and B. 
Combining equations (4) and (5) and normalizing 1≡BLw  , the volumes of the low-skilled LM  and 
highly-skilled HM  migration flows are: 
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The above two equations show how the educational composition of migrants depends on the key 
economic characteristics of the sending and receiving countries and the structure of the migration 
costs. However, still the quality extensive panel data on the skill premium is missing. Therefore, using 
equations (11) and (12), I express equation (7) in terms of the Gini index, which is closely related to 
the skill premium (see Appendix A for the derivations):  
 
 ABB
AA
A
B
H RSHDG
GZM α
α
α
α
α
⋅





−−−−−
+
+
Φ 1=  (8) 
5. Estimation 
5.1 Data sources 
Equation (8) dictates what variables must be included in the regression. Due to data unavailability for 
the educational composition of the incoming migration flows, I split the estimation into two parts: 
flow data and stock data. Estimation based on the flow data answers the question of the determinants 
of the volumes of the migration flows. Analysis of the stock data will answer the question of the 
determinants of the educational composition of migrants. From the data sources indicated in Table 1 I 
construct a balanced panel dataset for 67 sending and 13 receiving countries for the period 1996-2006. 
The number of receiving countries was governed by the availability of the immigration policy index, 
the number of sending countries was chosen in such a way that it was the same for all 13 receiving 
countries. The chosen time frame allows us to observe the countries of the former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia as independent migrant sending countries. 
Table 1. Utilized data sources. 
Variable Time span Source 
√ Bilateral flows of migrants √ 1970 - 2007  √ United Nations (2009b) 
√ Bilateral stocks of 
migrants 
√ 1975 - 2000  √ Brucker and Defoort (2009), Beine et al. 
(2011a) 
√ Internet penetration rate √ 1990 - 2010  √ OECD (2009) 
√ Airline deregulation index √ 1990 - 2010  √ OECD (2009) 
√ Immigration policy √ 1985 - 2005  √ Ortega and Peri (2009) 
√ Income √ 1970 - 2010  √ Heston et al. (2010), Solt (2009) 
√ Cultural and physical 
distance 
√  √ Head et al., Glick and Rose (2002) 
√ Years of schooling √  √ Barro and Lee (2000) 
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5.2 Flow data 
To estimate the determinants of the total flow of migrants I estimate the following regression: 
 +++++ −−−− 1)(41)(31)(21)(10= tjtitjti
it
ijt GiniGiniGDPpcGDPpc
pop
flow
βββββ  
 ++++++ −−− itjttjtjti AirlineIPRypopschyrschyr 981)(71)(61)(5 __ βββββ  
 +++++ ijijitit BorderLangasylpolentrypol 13121110 __ ββββ  (9) 
 ijtjitij uOrigDestYearColLinks +++++ 15151514 ββββ  
where: i  stands for a destination country, j  stands for a sending country, and t  is time. GDPpc is 
gross domestic product per capita in PPP constant prices 2005, Gini is the Gini index, yr_sch is years 
of schooling, ypop is fraction of population aged 15-29, IPR is internet penetration rate (number of 
internet users per 100 inhabitants), Airline is the airline deregulation index, pol_entry and pol_asyl are 
variables that quantify entrance and asylum immigration rules, Lang is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
two countries share a similar language and 0 otherwise, Border is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
two countries share the same border and 0 otherwise, ColLinks is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
two countries share common history, Year, Dest, Orig are year, destination country and origin country 
fixed effects, u is a stochastic error term the satisfies the classical assumptions. 
Regression 9 is estimated with OLS and GMM to account for the autocorrelation of the error term. 
Fixed effect is not applicable in this particular case, because due to the differencing the parameters at 
the dummy variables cannot be estimated. The estimation results are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Flow regression estimation results (OLS and GMM). Dependent variable - inflow of migrants 
per 1000 residents in the receiving country. Standard errors are clustered by country couple. 
 
OLS 
 
GMM 
  Estimate Robust SE Estimate Robust SE 
ln_distw -0.049 0.008*** 
 
-0.048 0.008*** 
ln_gdp_orig 0.110 0.052** 
 
0.116 0.049** 
ln_gdp_dest -9.622 2.882*** 
 
-5.409 1.614*** 
ln_gdp_orig2 -0.006 0.003** 
 
-0.007 0.003** 
ln_gdp_dest2 0.469 0.138*** 
 
0.266 0.078*** 
ln_g_orig 0.051 0.024** 
 
0.037 0.023 
ln_g_dest 0.039 0.019** 
 
0.033 0.018* 
yr_sch_orig 0.004 0.031 
 
0.016 0.029 
yr_sch_dest 0.147 0.123 
 
0.086 0.118 
ypop 0.010 0.126 
 
0.084 0.116 
ipr_orig 0.001 0.000 
 
0.001 0.0004* 
airline -0.020 0.005*** 
 
-0.020 0.005*** 
comlang -0.010 0.01 
 
-0.001 0.009 
comborder 0.547 0.092*** 
 
0.510 0.091*** 
colony -0.010 0.013 
 
-0.006 0.012 
pol_entry -0.008 0.003*** 
 
-0.007 0.003*** 
policy_asyl 0.018 0.00%*** 
 
0.014 0.004*** 
_cons 48.912 14.934*** 27.076 8.363*** 
      No. obs 5757 
  
5757 
 R2 0.14 
  
0.14 
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Despite technological progress distance remains a significant article of migration costs and the 
larger the distance between two countries the smaller are the bilateral migration flows. The coefficient 
at the internet penetration rate is positive and significant in most specifications suggesting that better 
Internet access in origin countries facilitates the dissemination of knowledge and information to 
potential migrants. The coefficient at Airline is negative and significant in all specifications, 
suggesting that the more developed the airline network (a decrease in the deregulation index) the 
higher the migration flows. Common language and colonial links do not explain the studied migration 
flows. However, the existence of common borders facilitates the migration flows. Immigrant entry and 
asylum restrictions are significant in all specifications. 
Amongst the economic determinants, the effect of the mean income (proxied by GDP per capita) is 
surprising for the destination country. Contrary to the theoretical prediction it is negative and 
significant, meaning that more developed countries accept fewer migrants. This is the case, however, 
for the developed countries with restrictive immigration policies. New developed receiving countries 
have fewer restrictive immigration policies and thus accept more migrants. The coefficient on the 
income in the sending countries is positive and again contradicts the theoretical predictions. I justify 
this result by the fact that the fast growing developing countries are making it possible for potential 
migrants to satisfy the budget constraint. Significance of the squared of mean income for both 
countries suggests the existence of nonlinear effects that have to be investigated in more detail. 
Positive and significant coefficients on the Gini index suggest that more unequal countries accept 
more migrants. I explain this finding by the fact that there is an increasing fraction of the skilled in the 
official migration flows. These react positively to any increase in skill premium, a fact that is more 
thoroughly researched in the next section where I account for the skill composition of the migrants. 
5.3 Stock data 
The regression specification in the previous section helps to learn the determinants of the overall flow 
of migrants. Equations (6) and (7) point to the necessity to disaggregate the flows by educational 
attainments. I follow the approach of Beine et al. (2011b) and proxy the flow variable by differencing 
the stocks. Stock data are available for 6 OECD countries with five year intervals. This proxy is not 
perfect because it omits those migrants who came and left their destination country within five years. 
To partially account for this problem I use lagged flow variables as an instrument for the stock. 
The econometric specification estimates the growth rate of the skilled and unskilled migrant stock: 
 
 ++++
−
−−−
−
−
1)(31)(21)(10
1)(
1)( = tjtitij
tsij
tsijsijt GDPpcGDPpcstock
stock
stockstock
ββββ  
 ++++++ −−−−− 1)(81)(71)(61)(51)(4 __ tjtjtitjti ypopschyrschyrGiniGini βββββ  
 ++++ ititit asylpolentrypolAirline __ 11109 βββ  (10) 
 
sijtjitijijij uOrigDestYearColLinksBorderLang +++++++ 171615141312 ββββββ  
where s  is migrant’s skill level, LHs ,= . Subscript i  stands for a destination country and 
subscript j  stands for an origin country. sijtstock  is the stock of migrants of skill s at time t in 
destination country i  who came from origin country j . GDPpc is the gross domestic product per 
capita, PPP constant prices 2005, Gini is the Gini index, yr_sch is years of schooling, ypop is fraction 
of population aged 15-29, Airline is the airline deregulation index, pol_entry and pol_asyl are 
variables that quantify entrance and asylum immigration rules, Lang is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
two countries share a similar language and 0 otherwise, Border is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
two countries share the same border and 0 otherwise, ColLinks is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
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two countries share common history and 0 otherwise. Year, Dest, Orig are year, destination country 
and origin country fixed effects, while u  is a stochastic error term. 
Since 1)( −tsijstock  on the left-hand side is included in the total stock of migrants, 1)( −tijstock , on the 
right-hand side, this creates an explicit functional dependence between the dependent and independent 
variables. To solve the problem I instrument 1)( −tijstock  with lagged flow values. The estimation results 
of regression (10) are presented in columns 1-4 of Table 3. In column 5 the dependent variable is the 
education composition of migrants, fraction of those with tertiary education in the stock of migrants. 
6. Conclusions 
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. Distance is a significant costs variable. 
In the case of the flow of migrants, the greater the distance the smaller the flows. This result holds for 
all specifications. However, the result is reversed for the skill composition of migrants: the more 
distant the country, the likelier migrants are to be highly-skilled. This confirms my observation in the 
motivation section that only the most capable will make it to a distant country. The lagged stock of 
migrants in the instrumental variable (IV) specification is positively related to the flow of migrants 
and negatively to the composition. This confirms the conjecture that diasporas decrease migration 
costs, the decrease being most significant for the low skilled. The income in the origin country is 
negative and significant in all specifications. As predicted by the model, income inequality in the 
destination country attracts talent, which is visible by the positive and significant beta in OLS and IV 
specifications for the skilled growth and educational composition. The coefficient at Airline is 
negative and significant in all specifications, which, by the construction of the variable, means that the 
more deregulated the market (i.e. a decrease in the deregulation index) the more migrants can come 
into the country. The entry policy variable is significant in all specifications. Colonial links, a common 
language and common borders are found to play no role in the growth of unskilled migration. I would 
explain this result with the existence of restrictive immigration policies that are most binding for those 
at the bottom of the skill ladder. Common language is important in attracting talent. The coefficient on 
the colonial links is negative and significant in the skilled growth and composition specifications, 
implying that history plays a negative role for the destination of the skilled. 
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Table 3. Stock regression estimation results. 
 Skilled growth  Unskilled growth  Composition 
 1 2  3 4  5 
  OLS Robust SE IV Robust SE  OLS Robust SE IV Robust SE  OLS Robust SE 
stock_pop (t-1) -0.009  0.008 0.056 0.033*  -0.011 0.006* 0.013 0.029  -0.010 0.004** 
ln_distw -0.117 0.026*** -0.102 0.028***  -0.121 0.029*** -0.116 0.03***  0.065 0.010*** 
ln_gdp_orig (t-1) -0.119 0.024*** -0.138 0.028***  -0.150 0.043*** -0.158 0.042***  -0.013 0.007* 
ln_gdp_dest (t-1) 1.257 0.991 1.625 1.002  2.640 1.186** 2.805 1.104**  0.189 0.179 
ln_g_orig (t-1) 0.021 0.088 0.007 0.090  -0.125 0.150 -0.132 0.153  0.032 0.027 
ln_g_dest (t-1) 3.495 0.742*** 3.467 0.750***  -2.975 0.864*** -2.981 0.899***  0.390 0.089*** 
yr_sch (t-1) -0.003 0.011 -0.001 0.012  0.004 0.014 0.005 0.015  0.005 0.003 
ypop (t-1) -0.837 0.736 -0.476 0.801  1.178 0.933 1.301 1.01  -0.201 0.225 
airline -0.101 0.025*** -0.104 0.025***  -0.055 0.026*** -0.057 0.03*  -0.002 0.005 
pol_entry 0.057 0.017*** 0.045 0.019**  -0.143 0.032*** -0.146 0.03***  -0.018 0.004*** 
pol_asyl -0.142 0.033*** -0.136 0.033***  0.041 0.036 0.042 0.035  0.060 0.006*** 
colony -0.092 0.053* -0.242 0.111**  -0.055 0.073 -0.109 0.082  -0.058 0.021*** 
comlang -0.017 0.038 0.006 0.044  0.066 0.071 0.073 0.072  0.067 0.014*** 
comborder -0.207 0.107* -0.342 0.151**  -0.085 0.102 -0.134 0.135  0.048 0.060 
_cons -23.032 9.819** -26.910 9.928**  -13.651 10.502 -16.758 10.351  -3.269 1.677* 
             obs 1457  1455   1470  1468   1457  
adj. R2 0.14     0.18     0.54  
F-stat(1st stage)   9.28     9.32     
  
Panel one (OLS) and two (IV): dependent variable is the growth rate of skilled migrants; panel three (OLS) and four (IV): dependent variable is the growth 
rate of unskilled migrants; panel five (OLS): dependent variable is the fraction of skilled migrants in the total stock. For panels two and four the 
instrumented variable is stock_pop, the instruments are lagged migration flows. Year and destination country fixed effects are included in each 
specification. Standard errors are clustered by country couple. 
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Appendix  
Derivation of the Gini Index for the model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the horizontal axis is the cumulative population of mass one with α  being the fraction of 
the highly-skilled. On the vertical axis is the cumulative wealth in the economy. Since the low skilled 
get Lw  their overall contribution to the economy is )(1 α−Lw , the contribution of the highly-skilled 
is αHw . Then the total wealth in the economy is αα HL ww +− )(1 , which is normalized to one. 
OA  is the line of egalitarian distribution: each agent adds an equal amount of wealth to the 
economy. Line OF  has slope 
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 and shows the contribution of the low skilled. Line 
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 and shows the contribution of the high skilled. The Gini index is the 
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Figure 3. Tightness of entrance and asylum laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ortega and Peri (2009). Author’s illustration.  
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Table 4. Cross-country discrepancies in the definition of a migrant in the inflow data. 
 
 Origin criterion 
Ti
m
e 
cr
ite
ri
on
 (i
nt
en
de
d 
du
ra
tio
n 
of
 st
ay
) 
  
Country 
of birth  
Country of previous permanent 
residence  Country of citizenship 
three months     
Austria(F), Czech Republic(*), 
Denmark(**)  
Belgium, Netherlands(D), 
Slovenia 
         
four months       Netherlands
(D) 
         
six months     Denmark
(**), Iceland, Norway    
         
one year     
Czech Republic(*), Estonia, 
Finland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania(B), 
New Zealand, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
 
France, Hungary(A), 
Switzerland 
         
permanent (open-
ended) 
permission to stay  
United 
States  
Australia, Canada, Croatia, Czech 
Republic(*), Israel(E), New Zealand, 
Poland, Slovakia  
Hungary(A) 
         
No time criterion     Germany, Luxembourg
(C ), Spain  Luxembourg
(C ) 
        
 
* Possession of permanent or long-term residence (at least one year), and three months for foreign 
nationals from EEA. 
 
** Six-months stay for foreigners from EEA and Switzerland, three months for other foreign nationals. 
 
(A) Year-long residence permit and settlement permit issued after continuous residence for minimum 
three years. 
 
(B) Holding one-year residence permit, a person must stay in the receiving country for at least six 
months. 
 
(C ) County of citizenship definition has been in use since 1990. 
  
 
(D) Duration of four months is valid since October 1994. 
  
 
(E ) Also includes holders of a three-year residence permit for “potential 
migrants”. 
  
 
(F ) From 2002 onwards. 
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Table 5. Cross-country discrepancies in the definition of a migrant – outflow data. 
 Destination criterion 
Ti
m
e 
cr
ite
ri
on
 (e
xp
ec
te
d 
du
ra
tio
n 
of
 le
av
e)
 
  Country of next residence Citizenship 
three months Austria(A) Belgium, Slovenia 
       
six months Denmark, Lithuania, Norway   
       
one year Estonia, Finland, Italy, Latvia, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom Netherlands
(B) 
       
permanent (open-ended) 
residence abroad 
Australia, Croatia, Czech Republic, New 
Zealand, Poland, Slovakia   
       
No time criterion Germany, Iceland, Spain 
Hungary, 
Luxembourg, 
Switzerland 
      (A) No time criterion is specified before 2002. 
   (B) Year-long criterion until September 1994. Since October 1994 - eight months. 
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Table 6. Flow data description. 
 
Name  Definition 
Australia 
Inflow Permanent arrivals. 
Outflow Permanent departures. 
Austria  
Inflow Foreign nationals who intend to stay for at least three months (since 2002). Before 2002 no time criterion was specified. 
Outflow Residents who intend to reside abroad for at least three months. Before 2002 no time criterion was specified. 
Belgium 
Inflow Foreign nationals and citizens who intend to stay for at least three months. 
Outflow Residents departing with the intention to stay abroad for at least three months. 
Canada 
Inflow Data are on foreign nationals granted permission to reside permanently in Canada. 
Outflow Data are not available. 
Croatia 
Inflow Foreign nationals and citizens with permanent residence in Croatia. 
Outflow Cancelation on permanent residence. 
Czech 
Republic 
Inflow 
Foreign nationals with permanent residence or residence permit valid for 
minimum one year, and EEA citizens who intend to stay for at least three 
months. 
Outflow Expiration of residence permit or cancelation of permanent residence. 
Denmark 
Inflow 
Foreign nationals who intend to stay for three months or more, and foreign 
nationals from EEA and Switzerland who intend to stay for at least six 
months. 
Outflow Residents leaving the country for at least six months. 
Estonia 
Inflow Registered persons who intend to stay for at least one year. 
Outflow Deregistered citizens who intend to reside abroad for at least one year. 
Finland 
Inflow Holders of a residence permit for at least one year and returning citizens 
Outflow Residents who intend to stay abroad for at least one year. 
France 
Inflow Foreign nationals who obtain a residence permit for one year or more and residents from EEA who do not require a residence permit. 
Outflow No data are available. 
Germany 
Inflow 
Foreign nationals who register their dwelling. Immigrating citizens are 
people of German descent who have the right to German citizenship and 
citizens from DDR. 
Outflow Residents who leave the country to establish residence abroad. 
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Name  Definition 
Hungary 
Inflow Foreign nationals with residence (valid for one year) or settlement permits (eligible for after three years of continuous residence). 
Outflow Expiration, cancelation or invalidation of the residence (settlement) permit. 
Iceland 
Inflow Foreign nationals who intend to stay for six months or more. 
Outflow Foreign nationals or citizens who are absent for at least six months 
Israel 
Inflow Foreign nationals who register for permanent residence or a three-year residence permit. 
Outflow Data are not available. 
Italy 
Inflow 
Foreign nationals who hold a residence permit for one year. Also foreign 
nationals from EEA members who intend to stay for at least one year. Data 
also include returning citizens 
Outflow All residents departing for one year or more 
Latvia 
Inflow Foreign nationals with a residence permit one year or more. 
Outflow Persons who change their country of residence for one year or more 
Lithuania 
Inflow Holders of a residence permit for one years or more and who stay in the country for at least six months. 
Outflow Persons who intend to stay abroad for at least six months. 
Luxembourg 
Inflow Foreign nationals who intend to establish residence with no time criterion specified. 
Outflow Foreign nationals who intend to establish residence abroad with no time criterion specified. 
Netherlands 
Inflow 
Foreign nationals who possess a residence permit and intend to stay for at 
least three months (until September 1994). Since October 1994 residents 
who intend to stay for at least four months.  
Outflow Intention to leave the country for at least one year (until September 1994) and eight months since October 1994.  
New Zealand 
Inflow Persons who intend to stay for one year or more, or permanently.  
Outflow Residents departing for an intended period of stay for one year or permanently. 
Norway 
Inflow Foreigners who wish to stay in the country for six months or more. 
Outflow Residents who wish to leave the country for at least six months. 
Poland 
Inflow Foreign nationals who establish their permanent residence. 
Outflow Residents who leave to establish permanent residence abroad. 
Slovakia 
Inflow Persons who register their permanent residence in the country. 
Outflow Residents who de-register as permanent residents. 
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Name  Definition 
Slovenia 
Inflow Intention to reside in the country for at least three months 
Outflow Deregistration with intention to stay abroad for at least three months. The data are supplemented by government estimates. 
Spain 
Inflow Registration of residence. No time criterion is applied.  
Outflow Deregistration of residence. No time criterion is applied.  
Sweden 
Inflow Foreign nationals and citizens who intend to stay in the country for at least one year. 
Outflow Residents who intend to leave the country for at least one year. 
Switzerland 
Inflow Foreign nationals who hold residence permit valid for at least a year.  
Outflow Resident departing to establish temporary or permanent residence abroad.  
United 
Kingdom 
Inflow Persons who have resided abroad for more than a year and upon entrance show intention to stay in the country for at least a year. 
Outflow Residents who have resided in the country for at least a year and intent to stay abroad for one year or more. 
United States 
Inflow Foreign-born persons who possess permanent residence. 
Outflow Data are not available. 
Source: United Nations (2009b). Author’s illustration.  
Figure 3. Migrants into OECD by category of entry. Reference year 2008. 
 
Source: United Nations (2009b). Author’s illustration.  
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